This study examines what motivates local emergency management officials to implement federal emergency management and homeland security policies within their own departments since the September 11 attacks. Pre-existing research claims there is confusion among local governments about potential changes to the role local emergency management services play before, during, and after natural, accidental, or terror related incidents. Meanwhile, additional research claims the federal disaster management policies (The National Response Plan, National Incident Management System, and Incident Command System) lack flexibility in implementation expectations, and there is limited cohesion among the layers of government, actors, and interests involved. This study asserts that something must spur local actors to comply with federal policy demands in their daily operations given how the post-September 11 policies change the field. The study specifically examines the effects of coercion, defined as actions taken by the federal government to force state and local implementers to comply with federal policy demands. Available federal grant dollars for emergency management and homeland security practices could make a dramatic difference to local emergency management operations, forcing these actors to comply with federal policy demands, even if it is in a begrudging fashion that deviates from traditional Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) principles.
the way it prepared for potential terrorist threats. Since then, politicians and media pundits frequently refer to any perceived lack of nationwide or local preparedness efforts for a potential terrorist attack as a "pre-September 11th" mentality. When making this claim, the same officials also remind us that an attack could happen to anyone, anywhere, and that we need to be ready for anything of this nature (Lustick 2007) . The aftermath of the attacks saw the development of the phenomenon Kingdon (1995) describes as an open "policy window." During this time period federal government actors created new policies that intend to reduce the likelihood of future terror events. These new policies refocused federal emergency management prescriptions designed to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate events stemming primarily from terrorism but also natural or accidental elements (Demchak 2002; McEntire 2004; Tierney 2005; Hite 2006; Waugh 2006; Lieberman et al. 2007; Perry and Lindell 2003; Scavo et al. 2008; Birkland 2009; Kapuçu 2009 ).
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001 many local jurisdictions used a concept known as Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) to prepare for and respond to disasters of all types. The use of CEM and its "all-hazards" philosophy has a long history of both theoretical development and practice in the emergency management field (National Governor's Association 1979; Drabek and Hoetmer 1991; McEntire et al. 2002; Hite 2003; Haddow 2005; Waugh 2006) . Traditionally, CEM all-hazards planning bases local department actions on a jurisdiction's risk assessment (Nicholson 2007) . CEM also demands that program management coordinates activities (mutual aid, drills, etc.) so that all elements of disaster management relate to one another and to the efforts of other public, private, and non-profit actors. Doing so creates a unified strategy to prepare for and respond to all disaster types amongst several key actors (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991; McEntire et al. 2002) . Therefore, CEM displays an inherent flexibility that accounts for a community's vulnerability and the actors' ability to handle situations as they arise.
But, many researchers claim that the federal disaster management policies created during that period of an open "policy window" (Kingdon 1995) after the September 11 attacks lack flexibility in implementation expectations, and that there is limited cohesion among the layers of government, actors, and interests involved in making these policies functional. These scholars argue that policies during the George W. Bush administration disproportionately focus on homeland security activities instead of traditional activities related to natural or accidental disasters and that the policies seek to standardize and centralize emergency management's operational direction at the federal level (Newmann 2002; Wise 2002; Esinger 2004; McEntire 2004; Haddow 2005; Schneider 2005; Waugh 2006; Takeda and Helms 2006; Edwards 2007; Lester and Krejci 2007; Nicholson 2007; Birkland and Waterman 2008; Department of Homeland Security 2008a,b) . The rationale for a centralized emergency management and homeland security policy was to create a standardized approach in emergency preparedness and response with all actors using the same plans and protocols while working together to handle prevailing situations (Takeda and Helms 2006; Lester and Krejci 2007; Posner 2007; Department of Homeland Security 2008a,b; Jensen 2008 ). This would, in theory, eliminate problems that may arise from agency competition and the lack of clear lines of communication and control during disasters, as seen on September 11 and previous crisis situations (Wise 2002; Donley and Pollard 2002; Newmann 2002; Posner 2007; Schneider 2008) . After all, any lack of coordination creates a conundrum for local emergency management officials in particular, especially when the time comes to prepare for and respond to any disastrous event.
Of course, it is impossible for disaster management organizations to portend or detect all terrorist attacks before they occur, just as it is impossible to deter or predict all natural disasters. Preparedness and mitigation efforts are crucial for CEM as well as homeland security related functions, even though they do not necessarily involve the same strategies. However, several scholars claim that federal policies incorrectly define these functions as identical for any hazard (Esinger 2004; McEntire 2004; Haddow 2005; Schneider 2005; Waugh 2006; Birkland 2009; Somers and Svara 2009; Jensen 2010; McKay 2010; Jensen 2011) . While homeland security related tasks involve several traditional CEM methods such as training, communication, and planning, not all activities related to homeland security are the responsibility of, or related to, local emergency management operations. Specifically, the effects of and initial responses to natural or accidental disasters and terror events are not entirely congruent.
Assuming other researchers are correct in stating the federal policies since the September 11 attacks lack flexibility and cohesion between all levels of government, actors, and interests involved, then arguably something must spur local actors to alter their actions to favor the federal policy demands. Any changes move local departments potentially away from traditional CEM methods as well as alter how they perceive policy responsibilities at the local level. This study seeks to determine whether coercion enhanced the odds of local actors reporting implementation of key features from three federal policies developed after the September 11 attacks; the National Response Plan [NRP -which has since been replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF) that is not included in this study], the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS). Additionally, the study tests whether coercion impacted the local actor's perception regarding who should be in control over certain emergency management and homeland security functions, defined as stages of the CEM hazard cycle and a similar homeland security cycle. Coercion occurs when a higher level of government (federal/state) mandates that lower levels of government (in this case, local) implement the policy desires of the higher level or risk some sort of consequence for non-compliance (Stoker 1991) .
The need for something to stimulate change seems especially important in localities where terrorism is not perceived as a significant threat when compared to other natural or accidental hazards. After all, what would encourage local governments to take such funding if they did not agree with the premise of the federal policy demands that accompanied such grant money unless they were coerced? Especially if doing so contradicts traditional emergency management philosophy, unless such actions are necessary to meet local demand during a catastrophic situation. But in this case, the notion that local governments would use grant funds and implement the post-September 11 federal policy priorities suggests that they are relinquishing control over emergency situations to meet centralized federal expectations.
To test for potential effects from coercion, a model has been developed based on Goggin and his colleagues (1990) "communications model" of policy implementation. The adapted model takes into account potential inducements from both the federal and local level, as well as local organizational capacity when coming to a decision. It is anticipated that the receipt of selected grants, a federal inducement, serves as a significant motivator for the decisions local departments make with regards to implementation of federal policy demands and perception of control over emergency management and homeland security functions.
Coercive Federalism
Scholars argue that conflicts between federal, state, and local levels of government typically increase when the number of federal mandates increases without associated funding (Gormley 2006; Posner 2007) . Coercive efforts generally seek to enhance federal control over policy fields by compelling local governments to implement federal standards through both regulatory and statutory requirements, as well as specific mandates, both funded and unfunded (Cho and Wright 2004; Posner 2007) . In the American system of intergovernmental relations many grant opportunities are coercive by nature. As Conlan noted, "intergovernmental mandates and preemption offer the national government cheap policy tools for continued policy activism" (Conlan 1991: p. 44; Cho and Wright 2004) . Contemporary coercive mandates from the federal level treat local governments as "regulatory agents." Policies with coercive features contain detailed standards and rules for implementation, which the local governments administer with little-to-no discretion ).
Stoker's "implementation regime framework" suggests that coercion is a key factor supporting the implementation of federal policy (Stone 1989; Stoker 1991) . He argues that coercion is a means to manipulate performance through consequences for non-performance or rewards for cooperation (Stoker 1991) . The consequences of non-compliance in contemporary emergency management policy follow Stoker's definition and seem simple enough to understand: the loss of the grant or support mechanism for any local action taken within the prescribed field.
But, Stoker admitted that operational and opportunity costs related to coercion limit the applicability of his theory. Enforcing a penalty would directly inhibit the goals of the policy. Knowing this, local actors could be inclined to wait for a more cooperative policy or relationship to develop rather than fully implement the federal policy prescription. Stoker claims that local autonomy works against the desires of federal policymakers by preventing the cooperation these policies both demand and need to flourish (Stoker 1991; Meyers et al. 1998) .
Despite the limitations, the use of coercive mandates permeated the latter half of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Republican and Democratic administrations alike centralized control at the federal level in several policy areas during this period. Compliance and the policy requirements themselves could be locally welcomed or implemented in a begrudging manner depending on their field and location. Posner (2007) suggested that during the George W. Bush presidency specifically "federalism issues were largely relegated to secondary consideration, often trumped by more compelling national issues and values (p. 392)." He cited policies like No Child Left Behind, welfare reform re-authorization, the Help America Vote Act, and several tax policies as examples of coercive centralization efforts. Other policies that pre-date the George W. Bush administration, such as the creation of a national speed limit law also demonstrate coercive federalism in action. In that case local and state actors attempted to sue regarding the coercive elements of the policy, but the Supreme Court upheld the federal government's ability to indirectly withhold funding should a state or local government not comply with a direct mandate (Tolley and Wallin 1995) . Posner (2007) further identifies several new mandates designed to address "homeland security" to enhance the command and control abilities of the federal government in the contemporary system of emergency management instituted following the September 11 attacks as coercive in nature (Lester and Krejci 2007) . For instance, local governments' implementation of NIMS provisions was tied to the receipt of specific grant funds and use of equipment designed to reduce the potential impact from hazards in a local setting (Edwards 2007) . As a result, efforts regarding natural and accidental disasters as well as traditional emergency management functions found themselves conflated with the "new" topical focus on terrorism, which took precedence on the national political stage during the George W. Bush administration. The new system uses a unified language, national standards and performance measures, and is arguably another attempt to provide what Kincaid (1990) previously described when discussing 1980s emergency management policies as "political cover" for officials potentially held responsible by an angry public.
However, the new and highly centralized plans potentially minimize traditional local CEM functions and fail to take into account the expertise and preexisting successful mechanisms that existed before the September 11 attacks in local settings with the purpose of limiting the effects from hazards deemed to be of the greatest threat. Local governments must, per the requirements of NIMS, consider "new" tasks (assuming preparing for terrorism was not on their local radar before September 11) designed to address terrorism within the traditional bureaucratic structure of preparing for and responding to disasters and catastrophes or natural or accidental origin. Terrorism, while particularly frightful and historic, is just another variety of hazard for which government organizations seek to reduce negative consequences (Tierney 2006) . Furthermore, problems may exist when considering how homeland security diverts the focus of emergency management activities away from the CEM all-hazards type philosophy, thus dismissing several years of local advancement in the field (Demchak 2002; McEntire 2004; Tierney 2005; Hite 2006; Waugh 2006; Lieberman et al. 2007; Scavo et al. 2008) .
When the federal government lacks funding as an inducement, it tends to create conflict between the various layers of government. This leads the federal government to focus on enforcing policy rather than development, flexibility, and innovation . Changes that the federal government made in the name of standardization after the September 11 attacks arguably limit the effectiveness of resources, like those cooperative networks already in place in most locales, and reduced the ability of local governments to respond to natural or accidental disasters (Waugh 2005; Neal and Webb 2006) . These differences in organizational priorities led to conflicts between agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and between actors at all levels of government, limiting their ability to develop improved emergency management policy and practice (Lehrer 2004; Waugh 2005) .
Posner (2007) adds that policies with a high level of federal cohesion and a low amount of state/local cohesion will result in total federal preemption of control. According to Posner, this is the case with homeland security and other specific counter-terrorism measures, where significant political support existed for the changes in public policy, particularly in the time immediately following the September 11 attacks. However, whether or not the federal government has total preemption of all emergency management is still debatable. The language of the NRP with regards the areas where state and local governments still have leeway remained unclear with regards to the effect that non-compliance with terror-specific protocols will have on other potentially necessary disaster related assistance or direction from the federal government (Sobel and Leeson 2006; Neal and Webb 2006) .
While the increase of the federal government's involvement in disaster management in general cannot be disputed, it appears to this and other researchers that the degree of preemption is partial at best, as the lines between homeland security and emergency management functions and responsibilities for specific levels of government remain blurry (Birkland and Waterman 2008; Lindsay 2008 ). Jensen's (2009 Jensen's ( , 2010 Jensen's ( , 2011 research of NIMS implementation follows these same lines. She found that while the federal government attempts to monitor local compliance with NIMS, they do not make an effort to determine how NIMS is included in the local department's daily operations, or how appropriate NIMS may be for the jurisdiction. This serves as yet another example of the degree of confusion inherent to the federal policies that followed the September 11 attacks.
Several studies show that even if local actors report implementation in general it remains unclear to many local actors what actions are necessary to comply with federal policy demands, or how federal policy demands directly impact their ability to work with their peers or with other layers of government during both terror and non-terror related disasters ( Scavo et al. 2008; Jensen 2009 Jensen , 2010 Jensen , 2011 . Such confusion about the federal government's involvement in and its policy demands for specific actions may spur local officials to report implementation, but not fully address all necessary avenues involved with the new federal policy demands or consider NIMS, the NRP, and ICS as part of their daily operations (Jensen 2009 ). This confusion can lead to a haphazard, chaotic response, rather than the clearly run, centralized response that the policies intend to provide. But, such a complex reaction or system of policy implementation is not out of the ordinary in the federalist system, nor is it an uncommon phenomenon in studies designed to monitor the success of policy implementation in general.
This raises questions about what kind of incentives would press local actors to comply with the new federal guidelines if it appeared that traditional CEM philosophies would better serve local demands during a disaster. If the NRP truly promoted a CEM all-hazards theme, it would not require all local emergency management operations to subscribe to one means to handle threats to a local community. Rather, it would allow individuals to make decisions regarding the time, money, and effort they spend addressing the specific threats that exist in the community, and what they mean for each stage of the hazards cycle. Placing greater emphasis on one particular threat (such as terrorism), with little consideration of its perceived risk to the community, is deleterious to the limited flexibility these organizations have because of their relatively small budgets and meager personnel numbers.
To facilitate the centralization of control over emergency management policy while also promoting the federal goal of preventing terrorist attacks the federal government encouraged local governments to apply for several new federal grants designed to strengthen homeland security and emergency management systems. Conversely, in a more coercive way, local jurisdictions risked losing funds designated for mitigating and preparing for disasters if they did not comply with the federal government's demand that they implement of NIMS, the NRP and ICS by the end of fiscal year 2005. Four specific preparedness grants; the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Homeland Security Grant Program, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, were specifically at-risk if local departments did not comply with NRP and NIMS protocols; a direct and arguably coercive threat. These at-risk grants covered materials, training, and other costs related to the implementation of the policies, as well as other local emergency management activities.
In a study of local emergency management officials in California, Baldassare and Hoene (2002) concluded that local governments expected funding from the federal and state government for equipment, but not for collaboration or for efforts to revamp established systems for emergency preparation and response. Thus, local actors who feel forced to use a system that dramatically alters their past practice may also feel alienated by the new policy's coercive elements, particularly if these administrators question the legitimacy of the policy or the federal actors' interjection into the field (Hill and Hupe 2003; Jensen 2010; Teeter 2013 ). These local actors may look for those particular portions of the policy that fits local needs and use them to claim compliance, even if they are not fully compliant with the federal policy (Lester and Goggin 1998; Hill 2003; Hill and Hupe 2003; Jensen 2010 ). Therefore, a policy's coercive nature and its perceived necessity in its entire (or perhaps partial) format for the local jurisdiction can drive the local administrators' decision concerning whether or not they should take part in what the policy has to offer.
In a related policy field, Weissert's (2001) study of primary care mandates suggested that a new policy's implementation is not necessarily a direct result of legislative language, but that implementation was determined by the federal government's funding to those proactive state agencies that supported the new policy mandates. In primary care, which shares important similarities to disaster management, the driving factor for implementing new policy was not so much monitoring and oversight as it was financial means; a conclusion gathered from the fact that the policy changes brought out a significant change in the preemptive behavior of the federal government. State organizations maintained a significant degree of autonomy, similar to what Cho and his colleagues (2005) described in welfare policy, but the federal grant funding helped to overcome any reluctance to act in support of federal policy demands that the organizations may have had. This illustrates the importance of coercion in policy fields where the federal government seeks to alter the direction of local government behavior, just as is the case in federal policy demands in emergency management and homeland security since the September 11 attacks.
Because of the available funding opportunities for new equipment, local governments may tacitly agree to federal requirements and the necessary alterations to their operations whether they intend to or not. If local governments agree to comply with federal demands, but do not follow through with policy expectations, it would cause significant repercussions on government operations at all levels in preparation for and response to all types of disastrous situations, leading to a conflated, perhaps redundant system that is slow to respond to demand; exactly what the federal policies desire to avoid. Local governments especially are likely to be confused about their role in the system, and how these new policies designed to "prevent" terrorism fit within the traditional scheme of disaster management. and his colleagues (1990), seeks to build upon its predecessors by defining those specific variables present across policy fields that may impact the implementation process. In terms of focus, researchers during this "generation" took two divergent paths. Some focused on the "top-down" or "command and control" orientation, which was an effort to find a way to best describe how to reach a policy's desired outcome with a focus on the policy's guidelines and definitions for successfully achieving implementation, along with institutional factors that can impact results. At the same time, others who focused on developing a "bottom-up" orientation suggest that successful policy implementation is based on the input of those in the field doing the work of implementation, rather than the policy's language itself (deLeon and deLeon 2002).
The "third generation" of policy implementation researchers developed their model as an attempt to provide an answer to their predecessors' problems by determining a predictive value for the federal (top-down) and local (bottomup) factors related to policy implementation (Cline 2000) . Examples of "thirdgeneration" policy implementation research follow several studies in various policy fields that used Goggin and his colleagues' model (1990) to explain how and why state and local governments implemented federal policy demands. The creators of the "communications model" used federal clean water, hazardous waste, and family planning policies as means to test the hypotheses and outlet for implementation research. They predicated their model on the idea of "policy clarity" as the central, driving factor for state and local implementation. Clean water policy, for instance, contained several clearly defined requirements for state and local government compliance. Local governments implemented these policies efficiently. However, when the policy's language was not as clear as local governments needed it to be, implementation was at best hit or miss. At worst, implementation became stagnant and subject to the turmoil of the political arena (which occurred with family planning policy in the original study by the authors).
Goggin and his colleagues created the "communications model" based on the assumption that organizational management issues, such as the enforcement of political/policy preferences, the structure of the institutions in question, and the technical competence of the actors involved have direct, primary influence on the implementation and perception of policy (Goggin et al. 1990; Cline 2000; Cho et al. 2005 ). While the model synthesizes top-down and bottom-up methods of implementation research, it provides room for federal-level policy leadership to "enhance the control over the implementation process that national formulators enjoy" (Goggin et al. 1990; Cline 2000) .
The "communications model" is made up of three key factors that can influence local policy implementation; federal inducements/constraints, state and local inducements/constraints, and state and local capacity. In the original communications model, federal-level inducements and constraints were designed to take into consideration the objectives of mandates, penalties for noncompliance, and the clarity of the message. State and local inducements focus on the local organization. Specifically this includes how the characteristics of the organizations at these levels determine implementation. Finally, capacity measurements as defined by Goggin and his colleagues are divided into two categories: organizational (referring to an organization's structural, personnel, and financial resources), and ecological (or the political environment in with the government entity operates) (Goggin et al. 1990; Cline 2000) .
Methodology
Because of the significant alterations to federal, state, and local actions during the emergency management and homeland security process, the study considers the potential to coerce local departments by the federal government in order to gain local compliance with the federal policy demands. Specifically, federal grant funding is expected to be the driving factor supporting coercion, as the local actors do not want to risk losing any grants. A local organization's non-compliance with federal policy demands would mean that they risk losing the federal grants for disaster mitigation and preparation considered in this study (the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Homeland Security Grant Program, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan). These coercive policy features may leave littleto-no flexibility for local actors, which means those in charge of local efforts could question the policy's necessity in the event that the new policies alter the traditional actions that the department takes Hill and Hupe 2003) . The following two hypotheses serve to test the impact of coercion:
Hypothesis A: A greater number of reported federal grants received by the local department will result in a greater level of reported federal policy implementation.
Hypothesis B:
A greater number of reported federal grants received by the local department will result in a greater level of perceived federal control over actions in emergency management and homeland security.
To test the hypotheses, the author conducted a national web-based survey of local emergency management professionals in May and June 2008. E-mail contact information for local professionals came from a web search of state and local government websites for contact lists. These professionals varied in title from "Emergency Management Coordinator" to "Police/Fire Chief" and all were identified as the point person for their jurisdiction's emergency management efforts. The search produced valid contact information for 2422 individuals representing municipalities and counties in all 50 states, of which 540 responded (a response rate of 22.3%). Those in the sample received two follow-up invitations to participate if they did not respond to the initial request. Those who participated represent 48 states (none from Hawaii and Vermont), with jurisdictions ranging in population from 130 to 1.84 million people. 413 of the responses came from individuals representing counties, while the remaining 127 serve at the municipal level.
Compared with general web survey results, a study by Hamilton (2009) of 199 web surveys had a median response rate of 26.2%. However, of those with samples sizes of 400-600 persons in the sample pool, this number dips below 20%. While these studies include far more than just government officials, it shows the response rate of local emergency management professionals in this study falls within the normal response rate for web surveys of its size. In addition, as with other web surveys, the majority of responses occurred within 48 hours of the initial or follow-up request for information (Hamilton 2009 ).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for Hypothesis A (implementation) stems from the timing of the decision to implement these policies, and is important because reported compliance by the key dates illustrates the desire of those involved to comply with federal standards. The "communications model" allows for federal and local conditions to influence their choice about control over emergency management practices. In this study, the dependent variable is specifically measured as whether or not local managers report participation in federally mandated policy requirements for training and mutual aid as a means to test for implementation of the ICS, NIMS, and the NRP. The study considers it important to focus on the timing of the decision to implement these policy requirements because it illustrates the desire of those involved to comply with federal standards, and the model allows for federal and local conditions to influence their choice about control over emergency management practices. In this case, the hypothesis tests differences between jurisdictions that chose to implement these policies before the landfall of Katrina, and those who did not. Coincidently, the end of the 2005 federal fiscal year, one month after Katrina's landfall, was the deadline for local NIMS adoption without placing the receipt of several federal preparedness grants at risk. If there is a strong predictive element between the receipt of grant funding with the managers reporting training and mutual aid activities that meet or exceed the policy requirements, then the study can confirm the presence of coercion. However, if the local managers report that they have implemented federal policies (generally speaking), but retain a perception of local control over the specific functions and phases (Hypothesis B), or have met selected but not all mandated implementation requirements for training and mutual aid, then there is evidence that local actors may only be nominally complying with federal policy demands.
When testing for Hypothesis B (perception of control) the dependent variables consider the degree to which local organizations implemented federal policy by testing whether there is a change in how these local organizations perceive who is in control over particular phases of emergency management and homeland security operations that the federal policies prescribe. The policies themselves represent a change of direction for federal actors in emergency management, moving from their previous role of supplementation or support, to one with a command and control structure and the centralized assumption of "primary responsibility" over disaster operations in DHS as stated in the NRP (Takeda and Helms 2006; Lester and Krejci 2007; Posner 2007; Department of Homeland Security 2008a,b) . This phenomenon appears in spite of the fact that the Stafford Act still speaks at length about the federal level serving in an assistance or supplemental role, with the dissonance between the two creating a confusing system for those forced to adapt. Measurement of the perception of general control over and within each phase of the emergency management and homeland security processes (Hypothesis B) is measured by considering how local respondents view who has "primary" control over each phase of the CEM hazard cycle and within a separate temporal cycle for homeland security related activities. The study suggests that as a result of the attempt to centralize the process for emergency management operations as well as prioritizing actions designed to prevent terrorism as cited in the literature, the federal government considers all actions during the phases of the hazard cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery), as well as the stages of homeland security operations (preparation, protection, prevention, recovery) identified by the Institute for the Economy and Future (IEF) at Western Carolina University (2006), as something that they have more involvement in, if not the outright direct responsibility to lead. Therefore, in order to comply with the federal policies local governments would need to recognize the increased importance of, if not direct control by, the federal government over these general stages and the steps generally taken within each stage. It is important to understand the reasons behind any potential gap in local actors' perception of control that differing levels of government maintain over these phases, especially while the tasks and stages are not analogous between homeland security operations and the hazard cycle, since the federal policies claim to favor unity in method to address all types of disastrous incidents. These variables allow for testing of coercion as the driving factor behind those who recognize the federal policy's control over all aspects of emergency management and homeland security, should funding from the federal level be a significant predictor of perceived federal control, as hypothesis (B) anticipates.
Independent Variables
For quantitative testing, the author developed independent variables based on the three categories from Goggin and his colleagues' (1990) "communications model" for policy implementation; federal inducements, local inducements, and local capacity measurements. The federal inducements in this study consider whether the respondent's department received one or more of four key grants that were threatened by non-compliance (the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Homeland Security Grant Program, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan). This serves as the primary measurement of coercion, and Table 1 illustrates the general number of these grants received by the survey's respondents.
Local inducements consider the long-term use of CEM "tools" by the jurisdiction, measured in this case by actions taken prior to the September 11 attacks. The CEM tools of interest are participation in mutual aid agreements with peer jurisdictions, and whether specific actions were taken to prepare for natural disasters and/or terrorist events. The survey for this study queries managers about their use of these means to prepare for potential incidents during different time frames; before the September 11 attacks, between the attacks and the landfall of Katrina in August 2005, after Katrina's landfall, or not at all. Given the pervasiveness of CEM and the use of these "tools," collinearity testing confirmed (Pearson's correlation significance at 0.05 or stronger) that highly active jurisdictions in preforming CEM tasks, such as exercises, drills, and creating mutual aid agreements with peer jurisdictions prior to the September 11 attacks were likely to do so in multiple ways. Thus, index variables were established for the local inducement stage when testing the hypotheses by combining terrorism related actions into one variable, and the natural disaster related variables into another. Each variable adds together the instances of those who reported performing the training exercises and drills before September 11 attacks in each respective category. Mutual aid agreements remain as its own independent variable within the model in dichotomous format; participating or not. Based on the characteristics of the jurisdiction, measurements of an organization's capacity must consider the unique limits of the organization that allow or constrain its ability to undertake different initiatives or take purposeful action (Goggin et al. 1990 ). Even with the full intention of implementing the federal demands, a local organization's limitations in manpower, funding, or decisionmaking ability can hinder the organization's ability to follow through. In this study the "ecological capacity" (Goggin et al. 1990 ) measurements include the type of jurisdiction (measured as a County), the population of the jurisdiction (logged), the geography of the district (measured as located in a specific FEMA region, #4 or the Southeast US), and the politics of the state in which the respondent's jurisdiction is located (measured as a Dillion's Rule state). These particular metrics were selected because the majority of respondents fell into these particular categories (Dillon's rule, counties, and FEMA region #4) or to normalize the results (log-population). Measurements of "organizational capacity" (Goggin et al. 1990 ) include the reported degree of change in the department's budget, the reported degree of change in FTE staff size between the September 11 attacks and the time of the study the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Limitations
The validity of this study is significantly dependent on the response rate of those who received the survey, and their ability to understand the software and survey questions. Although web surveys are still somewhat in their infancy, and studies of the general population show that individuals with internet access represents a specific segment of the population at large, leading to selection bias in the results, the sampling frame of this study circumvents this problem by focusing on a closed population of local emergency management government officials, with easily identifiable contact information (Schonlau et al. 2006 ). While potentially not universal, these officials have greater access to computer and web-based resources than the general population, and their exclusion from the study occurred only when contact information proved faulty (such as dead e-mail addresses) or they were not included as part of the sample at random.
As with all point-in-time surveys, changes to the policies of interest may dramatically alter the course of emergency management and homeland security policy. Also, all places are subject to various disaster types with varying impacts on the local community and the area's larger social or economic infrastructure, and long-standing efforts to prepare for or mitigate these disasters may influence their need or desire to alter emergency management policy, even following significant dramatic events that happened elsewhere. Therefore, the author cannot control how any historical event that may occur during the study will impact its outcome. The creation of a single point-in-time study seeks to mitigate these effects, but there remains a major potential problem with history's effects on this study. Research has shown greater action, such as policy development or change, occurs in the emergency management field in times following significant local disasters, and to a lesser degree from highly publicized disasters from across the globe (Birkland 1997) . Events in the time period before the study was fielded, such as Hurricane Katrina, along with the 2004 Southeast Asia tsunami, and international attacks against local transportation infrastructure systems in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) may have influenced the survey's results. Also, late in the survey's time in the field, flooding occurred in the upper Midwest and Great Lakes regions, which hindered response from that region of the country to an unknown degree, though it was likely only a minor drop off in potential responses that occurred as a result of this event.
Finally, the study is wholly dependent on the perception of the respondents with regards to the policies and any actions taken by their departments to comply with or ignore federal policy demands. While some key term definitions were provided for respondents within the survey, it is possible that these individuals had differing images of disaster size and scope in mind when thinking about what role the federal and local governments have during the stages of the emergency management and homeland security phase cycle. Some questions about specific actions during the phases are designed to counteract this problem, but it is wholly impossible to provide great detail for the questions and respondents while keeping the length of the survey at a manageable level.
It is unknown what effect this may have on the responses to the survey, and therefore there is arguably some limitation to the benefit of the data. But, these opinions are still valuable, no matter how the respondents perceived the questions. The responses provide significant information about the implementation of and requirements within federal policies, and their opinions arguably shaped any actions taken by local departments in the time since the survey entered the field.
Implementation Analysis (Hypothesis A)
Hypothesis A tests whether grant funding makes a significant impact on the odds that a local jurisdiction decides to implement federal policy demands for NIMS, the NRP, and the ICS. However, the results from ordinal logistic regression testing shown in Table 2 lack statistical significance for the receipt of grants as a predictive feature supporting local compliance with training and mutual aid activities for all three policies of interest (the NRP, NIMS, and ICS). Instead, when running the adapted communications model it was jurisdictions that were active in preparing for terror related activities that featured enhanced odds in complying with federal policy demands. The findings support the rejection of Hypothesis A.
The author finds it surprising that local administrators, in a stereotypically cash-strapped field, would not be influenced by (or the odds are not significant in support of) the direct threat of revenue loss that the policies of interest require when local jurisdictions do not comply with federal policy demands. Clearly, differences exist between the goal of the policies and how they are being interpreted and administered at the local level. Local actors, perhaps unsurprisingly, continue to want their own flexibility and control over the events in their organization and jurisdiction as expressed in previous research (Newmann 2002; Wise 2002; Hill and Hupe 2003; Esinger 2004; McEntire 2004; Haddow 2005; Schneider 2005; Takeda and Helms 2006; Waugh 2006; Edwards 2007; Lester and Krejci 2007; Nicholson 2007; Birkland and Waterman 2008; Department of Homeland Security 2008a,b; Jensen 2011) . This is a strong reaction against the command and control structure cited in the federal policies, and places the usefulness of policy's centralization features at great risk.
The findings calling for the rejection of this hypothesis highlight the importance of terror related CEM practices/tools as a driving factor for implementation. Local officials either are passive about the policy's threat to remove funding, or are finding a way to use the policy for what it is worth, by claiming implementation of the federal requirements, but not necessarily by-and-large doing anything more than the bare minimum to implement or to alter their previous plans for a disaster. If the local actors feel there is limited oversight leading to a lack of any tangible coercive threat (Stoker 1991) , or the roles for each level of government within the process are not clear, then why alter the process that has worked in the past until some event, or some form of clarity and oversight, forces a change to the system? Hypothesis B takes a closer look at the way local actors treat the new federal policies with respect to who is in control throughout the hazard cycle and homeland security process. 
Perception of Control Analysis (Hypothesis B)
Hypothesis B anticipates that grant funding makes a significant impact on the odds that a local jurisdiction's perceives a greater degree of federal control over the stages of the hazard cycle and homeland security process. Table 3 demonstrates that when testing the adapted communications model for these temporal stages, the receipt of grants had a statistically significant increase in the log odds for federal control over the actions of three homeland security phases (all except recovery), and one stage of the hazard cycle (preparedness). However, none of the models were statistically significant in whole, which limits the usefulness of these findings, as well as the importance of grants and coercion upon the perception of control over the various emergency management stages/actions and homeland security phases. The findings call for the rejection for Hypothesis B.
More than anything else, the local department's desire to maintain control over the phases before, during, and after a disaster was evident when reviewing the results from hypothesis testing. Actors at the local level seem to expect the federal government's support and involvement in the late phases (recovery in the hazard cycle) of the disaster relief process but not throughout the process, as the federal policies suggest. The experience managers have with CEM practices and working with the federal government may be the reason why local actors are nominally complying with the federal policies. With coercion having limited statistically significant influence on the local actors perceiving federal control over emergency management and homeland security phases, the local actors are treating these policies like a bump in the road, or perhaps like something to be called upon only when provisions really benefit them directly, just as Neal and Webb (2006) found in Louisiana after Katrina, and as Stoker (1991) suggested regarding the limitations of coercive policy language. Also, without coercion, then what May and his colleagues (1996) claim regarding the prioritization of rules enforcement in emergency management by the federal government has limitations, assuming that local actors use the lack of stringent enforcement to their own advantage as seemingly portrayed by the results of the hypothesis testing.
Conclusion
Testing revealed that respondents did not cite the receipt of grant funding as significantly enhancing the log odds of policy implementation by the landfall of Katrina, or the enhanced perception of a federal role within the CEM hazard cycle or homeland security process. These findings ran counter to the author's expectations that actors would not want to risk any funding by not following through with federal guidelines. However, the findings reiterate a major issue with theories related to coercion in government. Specifically, while the language may suggest that grant funding for specific projects are at risk in areas that do not comply, is the federal bureaucracy upholding such threats, or would political actors even allow the bureaucracy to eliminate such funding for projects within local districts? If such a threat is not tangible, and actors can simply report implementation of the policies with seemingly little threat of reprisal, while concurrently using the funds for specific projects or as part of their budget to respond to local demands (that may or may not be in line with federal policy demands), then the local manager may not be experiencing the full effects of coercion. Therefore, local actors do report compliance with federal policy demands, but the results suggest it is in a nominal fashion. With only nebulous effects from coercion, there appears to be other factors at play that affect the decision to implement federal policy demands at the local level. Indeed these actors may be acting in an "opportunistic" manner as suggested by Birkland and Waterman (2008) . Namely, the local actors see the benefits of federal policies and reported adoption, but understand there are little-to-no consequences if they do not really follow through with every expectation (Conlan 2006) . With policy decisions occurring at the federal level after the September 11 attacks occurring in the name of political expediency rather than expertise, local actors rely on their expertise and see little threat from federal oversight. Thus, they are more likely to comply with federal policy demands when they have experience in preparing for acts of terror at the local level; the new policies seemingly support their pre-existing local efforts. These local actors also know that federal "pork" spending is available if requested before an event, and that support money will come along should it become necessary after an event occurs (Birkland and Waterman 2008) . Future research should tease out what lead local actors to ultimately implement federal policy demands in this field to the degree they have, and determine whether these actors routinely act in an opportunistic manner since this test of coercion did not play out as anticipated.
Finally, as the author fielded the survey in 2008, a new federal policy, the National Response Framework (NRF), came online as an update to the NRP in response to the events before, during, and after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The NRF re-emphasizes coordination and integration of capabilities between all layers of government, as well as the general public, and any private businesses and non-profit organizations involved in any stage of the hazard cycle. The plan also seeks to enhance coordination between emergency management and homeland security operations, especially since local actors are still limited in intelligence gathering and incidence response to terrorist events (Kapuçu 2009 ). However, as opposed to the perceived federal dominance that existed in the NRP, the NRF claims to take a "national" focus by soliciting input from key stakeholders throughout the nation, and expressing in clear language the role of the DHS (Lindsay 2008) . But, the focus on counter-terrorism remains within the language of the NRF, which seemingly continues to move against the prevailing themes from CEM and an all-hazard approach. As such, it remains uncertain as to whether the NRF is really any update from the NRP, and if it contains a feasible plan for coordinating response as it desires (Comfort et al. 2010) . Obviously, with the NRF being in place for 6 years, as well as other events taking place during that time period (such as Hurricane Sandy on the Mid-Atlantic coast), comparing its effects on local managers as an update to this survey would be a fertile means for research. A follow-up survey may produce similar results, which could clarify questions about the NRF and its differences (or lack thereof) from its predecessor.
